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COVID-19 is threatening the lives and livelihoods of people in 
nearly every country on our planet. The spread of this disease is an 
unprecedented global challenge, requiring what the United Nations 
Secretary-General describes as a ‘whole-of-humanity’ response, 
supported by everyday people, governments, civil society and the 
entire international community. 
Humanitarians and health workers are on the frontlines of the COVID-19 
response. The collective expertise of the humanitarian community – local, 
national and international actors – will be critical to saving lives and 
protecting vulnerable populations from COVID-19.
As the pandemic evolves, and alongside it the humanitarian response, 
it is crucial that humanitarian actors make the best decisions possible as 
they adapt to the challenging and resource-constrained contexts in which 
they are operating. It is critical that we draw quickly upon evidence and 
lessons learned from the variety of approaches to containing the spread 
of COVID-19 around the world, as we also learn from other epidemic 
responses in humanitarian contexts. 
This is an excellent resource for doing just that. In addition to insightful 
perspectives from frontline responders and a variety of experts, this Rapid 
Learning Review for humanitarian organisations working on COVID-19 
provides vital insights and applicable lessons based on a review of evidence 
from the ongoing pandemic response and integrates key findings from 
previous epidemic outbreaks. 
It sets out clear operational lessons, offering guidance to humanitarian 
agencies in preparing, adapting and scaling up their efforts in response to 
COVID-19. Taken together, this reflects the best available current knowledge 
on the implications of COVID-19 for humanitarian settings, and is a crucial 
resource for our community. 
As the humanitarian community responds to one of the most far-
reaching and significant challenges of our lifetimes, it will be more 
important than ever to continually share with each other learning, 
knowledge and expertise. I hope that the actions and principles in this 
paper are widely read, discussed and applied, resulting in a strengthened 
humanitarian response to COVID-19 that protects and saves lives and 
dignity in vulnerable countries around the world.  
1 The United Nations does not represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, 
findings, interpretation, statement or other information provided by this document/guide.
Mark Lowcock
United Nations Under-
Secretary-General for  
Humanitarian Affairs 




This Rapid Learning Review is a tailored guidance document for 
developing a health response to the novel coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) in humanitarian settings. It is intended for humanitarian 
operational decision-makers and senior leaders responsible for developing 
and supporting their organisations’ response to COVID-19, and aims to 
rapidly assist frontline staff working on international, national and local 
humanitarian responses to the pandemic. The key question this paper seeks 
to answer is: 
How should humanitarian organisations prepare and respond to 
COVID-19 in humanitarian settings in low- and middle-income 
countries?
The paper offers key actions, insights and ideas for humanitarian 
actors to consider in their COVID-19 responses. While this paper draws 
significantly on the extensive health guidance provided by the World Health 
Organization, its target audience is primarily humanitarian actors, not 
governments or ministries of health. 
The guidance outlined in this paper applies to situations in which 
humanitarian responders are working alongside and with official 
government health system actors, and those in which humanitarians may 
be the principal coordinators and implementers of COVID-19 response. 
This includes individuals working for international humanitarian agencies; 
however, given how much the operational response to COVID-19 will 
necessarily rely on national and local actors, an important audience for 
this paper are the humanitarian decision-makers in national and local 
organisations preparing to support community-led efforts.
Similarly, while the entry point for this paper is health, the 14 key actions 
and 7 operational principles outlined also have implications for other 
humanitarian sectors – notably water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), 
shelter, and food security and nutrition. As such, it emphasises the need for 
effective multistakeholder coordination.
Readers should bear in mind the following factors and limitations when 




• The authors set out to emphasise lessons for humanitarian settings 
specifically affected by conflict. However, the evidence base upon 
which the team drew included several infectious disease outbreaks in 
the context of natural disasters. Although the lessons that follow are 
all cross-applicable to COVID-19 outbreaks in natural disasters, it is 
important to note that the translation of these lessons into implemented 
interventions will require contextual adaptations.
• While there are a number of similarities with previous humanitarian 
epidemic responses (e.g. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and 
Ebola virus), a simple ‘cut-and-paste’ application of lessons from the past 
is not advisable because each epidemic is different despite responses 
usually being the same; moreover, COVID-19 is particularly unique in 
being a global pandemic.
• The majority of COVID-19 response strategies have been designed for 
high-income countries and require significant adaptations for use in 
humanitarian responses. 
• Humanitarian responses are challenged by the fact that there are major 
COVID-19-related crises ongoing in every country in the world, and 
that typical operations – built on deployment of international staff and 
resources – will not be possible in many settings due to international 
travel restrictions and border closures. 
This paper summarises and synthesises the best available knowledge and 
guidance for developing a health response to COVID-19 in humanitarian 
settings low- and middle-income countries as of April 2020. Given how little 
is known about COVID-19 as a new disease, and given the lack of availability 
of high-quality evidence on epidemic response in low- and middle- income 
countries, the learning in this paper may be subject to revision and change 
as the COVID-19 situation evolves. 
There are still many outstanding questions, both for the international 
community as a whole, and for humanitarian actors in particular. Readers of 
this paper should bear this in mind and use this paper in concert with other, 
context-specific sources of evidence. 
As part of its mission to support continuous learning across the 
humanitarian system, ALNAP will provide routine updates to the paper over 
2020 to reflect emerging knowledge and evidence on the most effective 
approaches to COVID-19 response. 
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Box 1: Key questions for future and ongoing research and 
learning efforts
• How does COVID-19 behave in low-resource and 
humanitarian settings?
• Which populations are at higher risks of severe illness from 
COVID-19 in humanitarian settings?
• What are the most effective strategies or combination of 
strategies to reduce transmission in these settings?
• What can be feasibly done when there are limited 
supplies (e.g. PPE, ventilators, oxygen) and capacity and 
recommended public health measures and treatments cannot 
be implemented?
• What is the best way to prioritise and maintain essential 
routine health services? 
• How should trade-offs be made between investment in 
COVID-19 responses and dealing with other drivers of 
mortality?
• How should trade-offs be made between containment 
measures and the secondary impacts of COVID-19 (e.g. 
socioeconomic) on populations?
As Colombia braced for the arrival of COVID-19, MedGlobal volunteers provided basic medical care to nearly 1,500 Venezuelan refugees and 




The methodology for the research informing this paper is broadly 
aligned with that described in ‘Lessons Papers: A methods note’, 
developed by the ALNAP Secretariat in 2017 (Dillon and Campbell, 2018), 
and combines a review of relevant literature and a global stakeholder 
consultation with key informants:
• Literature review: The present paper distils evidence and 
recommendations from peer-reviewed research on operational responses 
to COVID-19, previous relevant outbreak and epidemics responses 
(including Ebola, cholera, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) 
and SARS), and related evaluations and synthesis reports featured in 
the ALNAP Humanitarian Evaluation and Learning and Performance 
(HELP) Library. The research team employed rigorous systematic 
review principles to identify relevant information from peer-reviewed 
and grey scientific literature on COVID-19 and lessons papers or 
systematic reviews on Ebola, cholera, SARS and MERS. We included any 
English-language papers containing scientific evidence for COVID-19 
published from January 2020; and any papers including lesson learned 
based on scientific evidence for previous outbreaks published from 2014. 
We identified 272 relevant papers after screening 7,680 records.
• Key informant interviews: The authors undertook a global stakeholder 
consultation with key health programme implementers and leaders 
working on the COVID-19 response in humanitarian contexts at local, 
national and international levels. We interviewed 33 respondents 
identified via snowball sampling (wherein existing respondents 
identified future respondents) and aimed to minimise sampling bias by 
ensuring our initial sample was diverse according to organisational type, 
geography, gender, function/role and level (e.g. operational/policy).
The methodological approach was both exploratory and explanatory; 
each data source was used to generate new evidence and findings from both 
literature review and interviews were triangulated in order to validate them. 
For example, the results of the literature review were shared concurrently 
with the study member leading key informant interviews to refine probes 
for the topic guide and ask for clarifications from respondents during the 
interviews. Findings from the literature review were also used iteratively to 
complement the qualitative findings.
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The methodology diverges from those described in Dillon and Campbell 
(2018) in the following ways:
1. The authors did not assess the quality of literature on which it drew; this 
was not deemed as a priority particularly because, similar to previous 
ALNAP Lessons Papers, most literature reviewed was of overall poor 
quality in terms of study designs and methodologies, which is to be 
expected given that many studies aimed primarily to be accessible rather 
than to demonstrate methodological rigour. 
2. Given the rapid nature of the review and evolving evidence on 
COVID-19, the authors did not extract data from all included literature. 
Rather they stopped reading and extracting relevant data when they 
hit theoretical saturation, especially after triangulating findings with 
those from the key informant interviews, to reduce bias and errors in 
interpretation.
3. Given the rapid nature of the review, the literature search on past 
outbreaks focused on peer-reviewed and grey literature reviews and 
lessons papers (including those in the HELP Library). The authors also 
drew heavily on the literature survey carried out for the ALNAP Lessons 






1. Support national efforts to assess COVID-19 impacts  
and surge capacities
2. Develop and communicate clear scenarios, guidance  
and protocols
3. Support integrated and coordinated decision-making  
and oversight
4. Prepare across the continuum, from community  
to health facilities
5. Prioritise people, money, essential services, and goods
6. Ensure that PPE for health workers and support staff is available
7. Prioritise syndromic facility-based surveillance
8. Adapt the testing approach to transmission scenarios  
and testing capacity
9. Targeting should account for and support the most  
vulnerable groups
10. Employ containment approaches to reduce transmission
11. Support socially and economically sensitive approaches to  
quarantine and isolation
12. Implement WASH interventions for effective infection 
prevention and control
13. Adapt health facilities and protocols
14. Deliver appropriate and relevant critical care measures




A. Preparing the health system
ACTION 1
Support national efforts to assess COVID-19 impacts and 
surge capacities
In February 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) called upon all 
countries to prepare for and respond to COVID-19 through preparedness 
and response actions in line with the global strategic preparedness and 
response plan (WHO, 2020a). While the COVID-19 preparedness plans 
have specific features, the process is one that will be familiar to many 
humanitarian organisations, as summarised by UNHCR: ‘a process, in 
anticipation of potential crises, of developing strategies, arrangements and 
procedures to address the humanitarian needs of those adversely affected by 
crises’ (UNHCR, 2015). 
Evidence from previous disease outbreak and epidemic responses, 
supported by the stakeholders interviewed, is that effective joint 
epidemic preparedness plans deliver significant benefits to subsequent 
interventions (Okunogbe, 2015). Given that planning and preparedness is 
already underway, humanitarian organisations can provide technical advice 
and input into the assessment process at national and subnational levels 
so as to strengthen the quality of the process and to help fill any gaps in 
preparedness and planning capacity.
Humanitarian organisations – especially national and local actors – 
have a specific role to play in ensuring that preparedness processes are as 
inclusive as possible, especially of the most vulnerable groups. Information 
on vulnerable groups may already be available through appropriate 
mechanisms, such as in-country focal points for gender, accountability to 
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affected people (AAP), community engagement, and age and disability. For 
some contexts, this information may need to be compiled quickly.
In particular, it is important to ensure a focus on refugees; while these 
populations should be integrated into national health responses, they are in 
many settings being excluded and scapegoated, with borders being closed, 
people seeking asylum refused entry, healthcare access restricted to host 
communities, and the widespread use of negative political rhetoric (Lau 
et al., 2020). This leaves refugees in a position of heightened vulnerability 
and is profoundly counterproductive in COVID-19 response as it creates 
situations wherein transmission will go undocumented –potentially creating 
more challenges as the crisis evolves (Truelove et al., 2020). It should also be 
noted that non-displaced populations affected by humanitarian emergencies 
are sometimes even more vulnerable and less accessible (IASC, 2020a).
“Humanitarian organisations – especially national and 
local actors – have a specific role to play in ensuring that 
preparedness processes are as inclusive as possible.”
As well as considering the potential impacts of the pandemic, 
preparedness plans should also take into account existing surge capacities 
for responding to COVID-19. This includes the capacities of national 
and regional health systems and those of national and local civil society 
organisations (CSO), communities, the diaspora, faith groups and businesses 
or wealthy communities within each country. 
Information on surge capacity should be forecast and made available at 
the national level using existing tools. These could include the following: 
• Adaptt Surge Planning Support Tool is an Excel-based graphical 
tool intended for policy-makers and senior planners to focus on surge 
planning information including: (1) the number of beds required; (2) the 
dates of predicted bed shortages; and (3) the detailed human resources 
needed.
• The Health Workforce Estimator tool estimates the required number 
of each type of health worker based on the number of mild, moderate, 
severe and critical patients presenting at health facilities per day. 
Humanitarian actors should focus on where they can provide support 
to (1) routine health services and (2) relevant actors and communities 
themselves to adopt epidemiologically sound mitigation strategies, mainly 
around prevention.
The existing number and distribution of health workforce by cadres in 
many humanitarian settings is very low, so creative solutions will be needed 
to maintain routine essential services. These include:
• mobilising unemployed and retired qualified health workers where 
relevant and appropriate
• advocating to mobilise medically qualified refugees who are usually not 
allowed to practice
• engaging community health workers networks.
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Key resources
• WHO. (2020b) National capacities review tool for a 
novelcoronavirus. Geneva: WHO. (www.who.int/publications-
detail/national-capacities-review-tool-for-a-novelcoronavirus).




• ACAPS. (n.d.) ‘#COVID19: a global joint response’. [Webpage]. 
(www.acaps.org/projects/covid19).
ACTION 2
Develop and communicate clear scenarios, guidance  
and protocols
Table 1 outlines two transmission scenarios for COVID-19 as drawn 
from the WHO (2020d). For both scenarios, the focus of the humanitarian 
response should not be on decreasing mortality of COVID-19 cases, which 
will be extremely difficult in most situations, but rather on preventing cases, 
especially among the most vulnerable groups, and protecting essential 
routine health services. 
To be effective, preparedness plans and related scenarios need to be 
established and combined with clear strategies and action plans that enable 
humanitarian responders to deal with each scenario as it emerges (Africa 
CDC, 2020a). Because the number of affected people is underreported in 
each country and increases progressively with each scenario, along with the 
scale of related needs, the demands on response capacities and operational 
resources will grow. As such, it will be essential to link transmission 
scenarios to resourcing and financial plans, with explicit and pre-agreed 
thresholds and triggers at which additional resources will be made available. 
Table 1: COVID-19 transmission scenarios
Scenario  
(as defined by WHO) Characteristics of the scenario 
Clusters of cases Settings experiencing cases clusters in time,  
geographic location and/or common exposure 
Community transmission Settings experiencing larger outbreaks of local  
transmission
Preparing for these scenarios will demand considerable forward 
planning and stakeholder engagement. Humanitarian actors will need 
to engage closely with hospitals, health centres, clinics, and community 
networks at all levels to ensure different plans and interventions are fully 
understood and owned. And as well as COVID-19 specific preparations, 
work will also need to be done to ensure the continuity of routine essential 
services (see Box 1). 
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Box 2: Preparing for continuity or adaptation of essential 
routine healthcare services
Evidence from previous epidemics, including the Ebola Outbreak 
in West Africa (2014) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(2018–2019), show that indirect health effects can exceed the 
deaths and morbidity directly attributed to the infectious disease (Lau 
et al., 2020; Truelove et al., 2020). Actors responding to COVID-19 
should prepare for the continuity of essential key health services 
and plan to undertake prevention programmes, ensuring that staff or 
patients are not exposed to excessive risk. Key approaches learned 
from past experience include: 
1. conducting a prioritisation exercise to identify services that 
are essential to maintain
2. delivering services intermittently or via alternative delivery 
modalities (e.g. via task shifting/sharing where possible and 
safe, and providing additional supplies of medication for 
chronic conditions)
3. adapting supply-chain management and providing 
extended medication supplies for conditions including non-
communicable diseases, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis, and 
modern contraceptive methods
4. freeing up healthcare capacity by postponing non-essential 
services 
5. setting up protected areas in healthcare facilities for essential 
routine services (e.g. deliveries) that have, if possible, a 
designated entrance not used by COVID-19 patients or 
health workers (Lau et al., 2020).
Effective preparation will include pre-agreeing and sharing guidance and 
protocols for key activities, covering: 
1. COVID-19-specific response guidelines and protocols for national, local 
and community workers
2. adaptation guidelines for all other essential health services
3. health information, education and communication (IEC) materials. 
This should be undertaken at a sector level to avoid duplication of 
efforts and to ensure the creation of and adherence to common approaches. 
International, national and local humanitarian organisations will need to 
work together to make globally available guidance contextually relevant and 
appropriate, paying careful attention to social and cultural norms and to 
local health system capacity.
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Key resources
• WHO. (2020d) Critical preparedness, readiness and response 
actions for COVID-19. Geneva: WHO. (www.who.int/
publications-detail/critical-preparedness-readiness-and-response-
actions-for-covid-19).
• Africa CDC. (2020a) Recommendations for Stepwise response 
to COVID-19. Addis Ababa: Africa CDC. (https://africacdc.org/
download/recommendations-for-stepwise-response-to-covid-19).
ACTION 3
Support integrated and coordinated decision-making  
and oversight 
In line with WHO recommendations, governments of affected states will 
need to establish COVID-19 command and operations centres to coordinate 
and oversee agreed response activities (IASC, 2012). Because of the diverse 
settings in which humanitarian actors might be operating, there is a spectrum 
of ways in which they might be involved in these centres (see Box 2).
In many countries, humanitarian organisations may be able rely on the 
coordination mechanisms already available and offered by the Global Health 
Cluster and country-level health clusters.
In the countries where it operates, the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is supporting UN country teams to 
work closely with host governments to prepare response plans, develop 
consistent approaches to information management, decision-making, 
supply chains and communications issues (OCHA, 2020).
Box 3: Role of humanitarian actors in emergency 
command and operations centres 
Shared: The government is willing and able to lead the response 
despite challenges, and there is some humanitarian capacity 
and willingness to work with the government to act as a trusted 
partner and critical friend in advocacy, delivery and learning (e.g. 
Afghanistan, Lebanon and Malawi).
Substitute: There is inadequate, unwilling or intransigent 
government capacity but strong civil society capacity, and the 
humanitarian sector in-country needs to work as the de facto 
response lead, with national and local actors playing a lead role (e.g. 
northern Syria, Yemen and Zimbabwe).
Supportive response: There is limited humanitarian capacity 
on the ground and so the humanitarian community must backstop 
and provide technical, financial and other resources through remote 
management (e.g. the Pacific Islands).
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While the specific roles of local, national and international humanitarian 
actors may vary, the following functions – adapted from the strategy of 
the Bangladesh National Preparedness and Response Plan for COVID-19 
(Government of Bangladesh, 2020) – are considered typical:
• coordinating and planning in liaison with Prime Minister’s Office, 
ministries and international organisations
• overseeing surveillance, laboratory and points of entry 
• using current and new structures for case finding, contact tracing  
and quarantine 
• enhancing clinical case management and infection prevention and 
control at heath-facility and community level
• developing and implementing risk communication and public  
awareness plans
• undertaking operational research.
It is critical to establish in a timely fashion the necessary command 
and operations and doing so will depend on the resources and sustained 
engagement of international, national and local actors. During the Ebola 
Outbreak in Sierra Leone, it took five months to establish command and 
control operations – due in large part to slow coordination among external 
donors and other actors (Ross, 2017).
In many settings, humanitarian actors will need to make sure that 
the different functions of the response work are delivered in meaningful, 
coherent and inclusive ways for the most vulnerable and at-risk populations. 
Especially important will be the role of real-time monitoring and learning, 
to enable ongoing well-informed strategic and operational flexibility in the 
response (Mercy Corps, IRC and ADAPT, 2016). Experience shows that 
humanitarian response analysis and assessments have an essential role to 
play in establishing appropriate and timely feedback that link into decision-
making processes at different levels, and allow interventions to be adapted 
(Obrecht, 2019).
Key resource
• Government of Bangladesh. (2020) National preparedness and 




Humanitarian actors will 
need to make sure that 
the different functions of 
the response work are 
delivered in meaningful, 
coherent and inclusive 
ways for the most 
vulnerable and at-risk 
populations.
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B. Preparing institutions and facilities 
ACTION 4
Prepare across the continuum, from community  
to health facilities
Humanitarian actors should focus on preparing health services, and 
interventions to support them, across the continuum from community- to 
primary- to hospital-level care to maintain community and health system 
functionality during the COVID-19 Pandemic.
Community level
Humanitarian actors should engage from the very start of the response 
affected communities and trusted sources, including survivors and 
community leaders, instead of it being an ‘add-on’ or afterthought (Chatelet 
and Sattler, 2019). Lessons from the Ebola Outbreak response show that 
the predominance of top-down communication in the early stage of the 
response sidelined community engagement as a critical operational tool 
(Arevalo, 2019). As a result, Ebola messaging and response strategies often 
failed to meet the needs of and realities confronting affected populations. 
To enable practices to reduce transmission, and to triage at the 
community level, humanitarian responders need to move beyond a 
traditional health-facility-focused response. Community-level efforts should 
account for language, cultural and social factors around risk perception and 
risk management, and follow good principles followed in other COVID-19 
responses (Zhang et al., 2020).
‘Community’ should be defined broadly and may include the following 
actors and networks:
• women’s groups and their leaders
• faith-based groups and their leaders
• business leaders and wealthy communities
• community representatives (e.g. refugee representatives in camps)
• youth groups and youth mobilisers
• elders (e.g. Shura councils in Afghanistan)
• community health workers and volunteers
• grassroots organisations
• local authorities including police
• survivors of COVID-19 (see Action 10)
• diaspora
• other key community members identified in impact and capacity 
assessments (Action 1)
Many tools can be employed to communicate risk information to 
communities. However, lessons from the Ebola response show that the 
communications strategy for the content and frequency of messages to 
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communities needs to be carefully considered, otherwise they may have 
the opposite intended effect. Take, for example, the messaging around 
bushmeat. Properly cooked bushmeat is not a threat to health, and while 
zoonotic transmission of Ebola may have been responsible for ‘Patient 
Zero’, the subsequent transmission to more than 27,000 people was human 
to human. Beyond scaremongering and obfuscation, DuBois et al. (2015) 
found that some early messages in the Ebola response risked ‘leading 
communities to believe that avoiding bush meat was more important than 
not touching dead bodies’. Overly negative messaging can increase stigma, 
deter people from reporting symptoms and seeking treatment, and steer 
people away from health facilities and towards traditional healers or their 
families (where they may infect vulnerable relatives).
Health-facility level
In low-resource settings, humanitarian actors should ensure that 
essential non-COVID-19 services can be sustained safely and then 
assess whether the facility is adapted and resourced for COVID-19 case 
management, according to the different categories of severity (e.g. critical, 
severe, mild) (Wu and McGoogan, 2020). In most cases, health facilities will 
not be able to care for critical cases and may need to be designated only for 
mild and moderate cases, and possibly for severe cases, if oxygen treatment 
can be guaranteed.
Efforts by humanitarian actors to prepare health facilities should include 
the following five steps:
1. Preparing the clinic, including:
• conducting health-facility assessments to measure health facilities’ 
level of readiness and taking action based on the analysis of the 
assessment
• establishing a triage protocol
• assessing bed availability and capacity for both critical care provision, 
where possible, and essential routine services (see Action 1; WHO, 
2020c). At a minimum, oxygen needs to be available for all cases of 
COVID-19 requiring hospitalisation
• sharing among health workers and support staff knowledge about 
COVID-19 guidance and protocols (Action 2)
• sharing key information to enable communication (e.g. contact 
details and functions of key health-system actors)
• ensuring enough consumables, drugs, equipment, IEC supplies, etc., 
in particular PPE and oxygen sources (Action 6).
2. Preparing both medical and non-medical health facility staff, which 
should include providing rapid training on relevant protocols for 
infection prevention and control (IPC), personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and clinical care for COVID-19 (Action 2); and rehearsing safe 
triage processes (Action 14). 
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3. Communicating with patients, which should include providing  
signage about preventive measures at health facility entrances and in 
waiting areas. 
4. Preparing the waiting area(s) and consulting rooms for both COVID-19 
cases and other essential prioritised health services. For example, this 
should include:
• having sufficient hand sanitiser or hand-washing stations available in 
waiting rooms
• ensuring chairs are 2 metres apart or marking 2-metre intervals on 
benches to indicate to people how far apart they should sit
• opening all doors and windows to ensure rooms are well-ventilated
• ensuring that all patients’ beds are placed at least one metre apart 
regardless of whether they are suspected COVID-19 cases.
COVID-19 cases will need to be isolated and cared for separately 
according to their lab status and/or severity. Suspected cases must be 
identified as early as possible upon a person’s arrival at any health facility 
(see Action 14).
5. Prepare an isolation room or area for those patients with suspected 
COVID-19 who require referral or transport to a facility at the next 
health-system level (see Action 14).
COVID-19 patient care units. Photo credit: Flickr/ New York National Guard
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Key resources
Community level
• UN Women and Translators without Borders. (2020) COVID-19: 
how to include marginalized and vulnerable people in risk 
communication and community engagement. Risk Communication 
and Community Engagement Working Group on COVID-19. 
(https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
COVID-19_CommunityEngagement_130320.pdf).
• PAHO/WHO. (2020) COVID-19 guidelines for communicating 




• Bugge, J. (2017) Rumour has it: a practical guide to working with 
rumours. London: CDAC Network.(www.cdacnetwork.org/tools-
and-resources/i/20170613105104-5v7pb).
• Wellcome, IDS and Anthrologica. (2020) Key considerations: 
online information, mis- and disinformation in the context 





• Baggio, O., Camara, C.A. and Prue, C. (2019) ‘Bringing 
community perspectives to decision-making in the Ebola response 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ Humanitarian Practice 




• Options Consultancy Services and CERAHGENEVE – Geneva 
Centre for Education and Research in Humanitarian Action. 
(2020) COVID-19 health facility assessment for primary health 
care facilities [version 03 April 2020]. Geneva: CERAHGENEVE. 
(https://www.cerahgeneve.ch/resources/covid-19-response-
tools).
• Nigeria PHCDA. (2020) Preparedness and response to 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) at primary healthcare 
and community level. Lagos: National Primary Health 
Care Development Agency, Government of Nigeria. (www.
humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/nigeria/document/national-
primary-health-care-development-agency-preparedness-and).
• Lentfer, J. (2020) ‘Resource list: communicating 





Prioritise people, money, essential services, and goods
Together, governments and humanitarian organisations need to conduct 
a prioritisation exercise that looks across several criteria, including life-
saving health interventions, protection of patients and staff, equity and 
ethical issues. The result of this prioritisation will determine which 
interventions should continue, be adapted or postponed. This will also 
dictate how existing resources can be allocated to the COVID-19 response.
Human resources planning
Evidence from the COVID-19 response and from previous epidemics 
suggests that the virus will negatively impact response staffing due to health 
workers and key support staff falling ill, suffering from higher mortality 
rates compared to the general population and having increased caring 
duties, and due to travel restrictions and quarantine measures, which 
prevent the deployment of expatriates (DuBois et al., 2015). Staffing options 
and needs based on different scenarios should from the outset be written 
into protocols and shared widely with all actors involved in the response, 
from the local to international levels. 
Given resources and capacities are extremely constrained, humanitarian 
actors should not support unrealistic plans to scale up case management. 
Instead, key actions for humanitarian actors should include:
• working to strengthen frontline- and support-staff capacity and skills, 
including refresher trainings on core competencies and trainings specific 
to COVID-19
• helping to equip all cadres of staff with a minimal level of equipment (e.g. 
PPE); a place from which to work; and a working telephone or mobile 
phone number
• ensuring that human resources are mobilised to focus on prevention and 
working with communities (Mor, 2020).
“Lessons learned from several previous outbreaks and 
epidemics underscore the importance of coordinated 
action on procurement and logistical issues.”
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Financial resources planning
Humanitarian actors will also need to prioritise from the start of the 
response flexible financial resourcing. Based on evidence from previous 
outbreaks, it is unlikely that all requested funds will be available, and there 
is potential for funding cuts from Global North countries as they deal 
with their own COVID-19 responses. Moreover, as the pandemic is global, 
it is challenging for donors to prioritise their support. Key actions for 
humanitarian actors should include:
• assessing COVID-19-related funding needs in line with potential 
scenarios (Action 2)
• assessing the impact of COVID-19 on the existing financial base 
• agreeing flexible funding arrangements across donors (including 
governments), with particular attention on how to:
• repurpose or redirect existing healthcare investments where 
essential
• negotiate blanket waivers, extensions, etc. to reduce administrative 
workload 
• make funds available to finance large-scale, locally led efforts. 
Essential services planning
See Box 1 in Action 2.
Pre-positioning and negotiating supply chains and goods
Lessons learned from several previous outbreaks and epidemics 
underscore the importance of coordinated action on procurement and 
logistical issues. The WHO has developed the COVID-19 Essential 
Supplies Forecasting Tool (ESFT) to help governments, partners and other 
stakeholders to estimate requirements for essential supplies needed to 
respond to the current pandemic (WHO, 2020e). 
However, the systematic closure of borders and airports to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 is preventing or delaying the supply of several essential 
goods, such as medicines, PPE, oxygen concentrators and mechanical 
ventilators.
Another significant problem with supply of essential goods is that it is 
not managed globally, and is experiencing additional pressure given demand 
around the world; both production and stocks are being managed at national 
levels, which means that some countries will always be at a disadvantage. 
And although local production of some basic PPE (such as surgical gowns 
or face masks) may be possible, local production of cartridges for diagnostic 
GeneXpert® machines will not be possible due to legal issues. Given the 
scarcity of essential equipment in many resource-constrained settings, 
alternative mechanisms will need to be found for the provision of supplies.
Humanitarian actors both at country and at global level should take 
the following actions to support the procurement and distribution of 
consumables, medicines and equipment:
Responding to COVID-1924
• Develop priority resource lists (which can be adapted from existing lists) 
for both COVID-19 and essential health activities, ensuring that resource 
planning is coordinated with the overall response
• Assess essential consumables, medicines and equipment, medicine and 




• energy (including the stability and continuity of power supplies)
• supplies for maintaining or adapting essential health services.
• International humanitarian organisations should pre-position relevant 
consumables, medicines and equipment by negotiating with relevant 
actors (e.g. government officials in charge of national medical stores, the 
United Nations Population Fund for reproductive health kits containing 
contraception and essential supplies for safe deliveries and relevant 
businesses for PPE)
• Engage with suppliers and pharmacies (both public and private) to allow 
dynamic inventory assessment and coordinated redistribution according 
to need
• Determine logistics contingency plans in the event of future restrictions 
to people’s movements and disruptions to travel and supply chains (e.g. 
identifying alternative supplies, boosting or creating regional and local 
production)
• Negotiate and secure movement exemptions for essential goods and 
responders
• Encourage and capitalise on reverse or frugal innovations, ensuring that 
some funding is earmarked for them.
Key resources
• Humanitarian Advisory Group. (2020) In case of emergency: 
system-wide response in the era of COVID-19. Melbourne: 
Humanitarian Advisory Group. (https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.
org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/HAG_COVID19ThinkPiece_
March2020_FINAL.pdf).
• IASC. (2020b) Flexible funding for humanitarian response and 




• WHO. (2020e) WHO COVID-19 Essential Supplies Forecasting 
Tool (ESFT). Geneva: WHO. (www.who.int/emergencies/
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/covid-19-
critical-items?mc_cid=b6c6054319&mc_eid=5b4b5dadee).
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ACTION 6
Ensure that PPE for health workers and support staff  
is available 
PPE is the most important tool to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 
from patients to health workers and support staff, and vice versa. Hundreds 
of healthcare workers died during the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa 
because of lacking and suboptimal use of PPE, and the same is already 
happening across the developed world amid the COVID-19 Pandemic.
Pre-positioning PPE stock and establishing and communicating 
protocols for why, when and how to use it are essential in the context of 
the COVID-19 Pandemic. Also crucial is training healthcare workers and 
support staff prior to, or at the very early onset of the outbreak to use PPE 
correctly (Lockhart et al., 2020).
The surge capacity of healthcare workers and support staff requiring 
PPE should be assessed to estimate PPE needs (WHO, 2014). The list of 
individuals requiring PPE for COVID-19 includes, but is not limited to:
• all suspected or confirmed COVID-19 patients during triage and when 
undergoing evaluation
• healthcare workers and caregivers who work with suspected cases of 
COVID-19, staff who screen newcomers at entry points and ambulance 
drivers
• all support staff who clean rooms or areas used by patients with 
suspected or confirmed COVID-19
• all laboratory staff who handle patient specimens and body fluids
• safe burial teams who remove bodies of people suspected with COVID-19
• first responders to and visitors of people suspected with COVID-19 
(ECDC, 2020; WHO, 2020f ).
Shortages of PPE for COVID-19 have been observed all over the world. 
Where possible, international humanitarian actors should attempt to 
manage PPE stock globally (Action 5). Regional or local production of PPE 
should be supported and boosted to reduce risks of shortage of PPE at 
crucial times, and protocols should promote the rational use of PPE based 
on available evidence including WHO guidance (WHO, 2020f ).
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Key resources
• WHO. (2020f) Rational use of personal protective equipment 
for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and considerations during 




• WHO. (2020g) Clinical care for severe acute respiratory infection: 
toolkit – COVID-19 adaptation. Geneva: WHO: 40–41. (https://
apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/331736).
• Nigeria PHCDA. (2020) Preparedness and response to 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) at primary healthcare 
and community level. Lagos: National Primary Health Care 
Development Agency, Government of Nigeria: 21–23. (www.
humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/nigeria/document/national-
primary-health-care-development-agency-preparedness-and).
Inside the registration room of the Sambhavna Clinic. Photo credit: Biju Nair, The Bhopal Medical Appeal
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C. Strengthening detection
ACTION 7
Prioritise syndromic facility-based surveillance
Lessons learned from SARS and Ebola show that when surveillance is 
instituted promptly, rapidly, and effectively, it enables the timely recognition 
of disease emergence and is an important factor in breaking chains of 
transmission. Evidence also shows that ineffective surveillance led to 
initial delays in detecting and reporting SARS and Ebola, and significantly 
increased their spread and impacts.
For COVID-19, it is primarily important to know where each setting is 
in the epidemic curve (the statistical charting of an epidemic’s onset and 
progress), so in resource-constrained settings syndromic surveillance 
within health facilities will likely be sufficient. Syndromic surveillance 
is the continual and systematic collection and analysis of data related to 
population and individual health indicators. In settings where there are 
sufficient resources and capacities to collect, and more importantly, analyse 
data and to act on its findings, humanitarian actors should rely primarily 
on information from communities, either by putting in place or building 
on existing surveillance systems. They will also have to be integrated with 
routine facility-based systems to inform decision-making (Ramalingam, 2016).
An important part of surveillance is contact tracing – identifying anyone 
who has come into close contact with a person who has tested positive for 
the disease. While this can be implemented in different ways in different 
settings, it is important to note that it is not being fully utilised even in 
many high-income countries because it is very resource intensive. As noted 
by the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention: ‘given the speed 
of transmission of COVID-19, the number of contacts requiring follow-up 
can be expected to increase rapidly if sustained community transmission 
occurs’ (Africa CDC, 2020b). Contact tracing in the way it would need 
to be implemented in humanitarian settings (e.g. manually compared to 
digitally in South Korea) is resource intensive and at a certain point may 
no longer contribute enough to effective epidemic control to justify the 
resources required.
Attempting to follow up all contacts can jeopardise the quality of 
contact tracing and divert resources away from other interventions. 
In many humanitarian settings, it will simply not be possible to use 
effective approaches. In addition to being calibrated to the level of 
resources available, any contact tracing efforts would need to be 
culturally specific and implemented in a way that is acceptable to 
affected communities (see Action 4).
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Key resources
• IFRC. (2017) Community-based surveillance: guiding principles. 
Geneva: IFRC. (https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/
sites/5/2018/03/CommunityBasedSurveillance_Global-LR.pdf).
• WHO Regional Office for Africa. (2014) Integrated disease 
surveillance and response in the African Region: a guide for 
establishing community-based surveillance. Brazzaville: WHO 
Regional Office for Africa. (www.afro.who.int/sites/default/
files/2017-06/a-guide-for-establishing-community-based-
surveillance-102014_0.pdf).
• WHO. (2020g) Household transmission investigation protocol 





Adapt the testing approach to transmission scenarios and 
testing capacity 
Testing can help determine how widespread infection is, identify risk 
groups and transmission patterns, anticipate next steps and guide the 
planning and development of appropriate strategies. Testing approaches 
should be context dependent:
• In contexts with few or no cases, testing should inform containment 
strategies and, where feasible, facilitate contact tracing. People who have 
symptoms can be safely and rapidly isolated to prevent further spread.
• In contexts with widespread transmission and in the later phases of the 
outbreak, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing could help identify 
and stop emerging clusters (e.g. in refugee or internally displaced person 
camps) and take necessary action. 
However, past experience shows that testing is unlikely to be a 
sustainable and feasible strategy in many humanitarian settings due to 
limited public health, laboratory and primary health care services (Poole et 
al., 2020) and due to the lack internationally of available testing supplies. 
Testing approaches should therefore also be adapted to testing capacity. 
Most laboratories are based in capital cities and will be unable to cope with 
analysing samples from urban residents, let alone those from the rest of the 
country. Given the changing research and development landscape for the 
COVID-19 response, it is to be hoped that new, less resource-intensive tests 
will eventually be integrated into the humanitarian response.
There is no evidence to date for an appropriate or ‘good enough’ 
alternative to testing for COVID-19 in low-resource settings. However, 
a number of workarounds are already being employed, including triage 
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based on clinical case definition or presumptive diagnosis (Hopman et al., 
2020). For example, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control has developed a 
flow chart to help health workers assess patients presenting with COVID-19 
symptoms when they arrive at the health facility (Figure 1; Nigeria PHCDA, 
2020). This is specific to the Nigerian context – and includes reference 
to isolation rooms, local and national hotlines, ambulance systems, 
testing facilities and laboratory capacity. However, similar flowcharts 
can be developed for different settings, based on existing capacity and 
resource levels.
Key resources
• WHO. (2020h) Laboratory testing strategy recommendations for 
COVID-19: interim guidance [21 March]. Geneva: WHO. (https://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331509/WHO-COVID-
19-lab_testing-2020.1-eng.pdf).
• Nigeria PHCDA. (2020) Preparedness and response to 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) at primary healthcare 
and community level. Lagos: National Primary Health Care 
Development Agency, Government of Nigeria: 21–23. (www.
humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/nigeria/document/national-
primary-health-care-development-agency-preparedness-and).
• WHO. (2020g) Household transmission investigation protocol 





Figure 1: Flow chart for health worker assessment of patients 
presenting with COVID-19 symptoms at health facility
Source: Adapted from Nigeria’s preparedness and response plan (Nigeria PHCDA, 2020).
Patient or client reports fever,
 cough or shortness of breath
Do you have any of the following 
symptoms?
 • Cough
 • Shortness of breath
 • Sore throat
 • Fever
Quickly provide patient with a mask 
and drops of hand sanitiser to 
disinfect hands 
Quickly ask for history of any of the 
following:
 • Travel to any regions/states/local 
areas with confirmed COVID-19 
cases
 • Travel to any country with confirmed 
COVID-19 cases
 • Had a 24-hour transit in a COVID-19 
endemic country or town
 • Close contact with a confirmed case 
of COVID-19
 • Exposure to a health facility where 
COVID-19 case(s) have been 
reported
 • Counsel patient explaining why it is a 
suspected case and why the patient 
is in isolation 
 • Move patient to isolation room/corner
Follow protocol to notify relevant 
authorities, e.g. by calling a supervisor/
emergency hotline number/etc.
Patient or client reports no fever,
 cough or shortness of breath
 • Allow patient into prepared waiting room
 • While waiting for consultation, 
demonstrate hand washing and use IEC 
materials to give talks
Quickly ask for history of any of the 
following:
 • Travel to any regions/states/local areas 
with confirmed COVID-19 cases
 • Travel to any country with confirmed 
COVID-19 cases
 • Had a 24-hour transit in a COVID-19 
endemic country or town
 • Close contact with a confirmed case of 
COVID-19
 • Exposure to a health facility where 
COVID-19 case(s) have been reported
 • Identify and counsel close contacts of 
patients including those that accompany 
patients to the health facility
 • Inform community leaders to be vigilant
 • Inform other health facilities in your 
community
Keep patient in isolation room/corner until 
ambulance/emergency transport arrives.
DO NOTHING TO THE PATIENT, 
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D. Investing in prevention 
ACTION 9
Targeting should account for and support the most 
vulnerable groups 
A key first step to targeting the response is to identify populations 
at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 due to underlying conditions. 
Humanitarian actors in particular have a two-pronged role to play in 
targeting vulnerable individuals:
• Identifying and mapping populations vulnerable to COVID-19 (e.g. older 
people, those with comorbidities (other underlying health conditions), 
refugees or displaced peoples)
• Identifying the most appropriate channels by which to reach these 
populations (e.g. via institutional memory, existing relationships with 
specific groups to which target populations belong – see Actions 5 and 7).
Underlying conditions that make people vulnerable to COVID-19 
are likely to be the same globally; however, their prevalence within the 
population will vary according to context. Moreover, some populations 
in low-resource settings will not have been diagnosed with or treated for 
underlying conditions. While some settings with younger demographic 
profiles could potentially see a lower rate of severe COVID-19 cases due 
to their age, compared with upper-middle and high-income countries 
with older populations, the poor overall health status of populations in 
humanitarian settings (because of, e.g., malnutrition, tuberculosis and HIV/
AIDS) could cause more severe cases (Truelove et al., 2020). 
Accordingly, humanitarian actors should identify and target vulnerable 
populations as defined by Favas et al. (2020) in Table 2. Targeting 
approaches should be developed by working closely with health facilities, 
social services and community leaders.
“Poor overall health status of populations in humanitarian 
settings (because of, e.g., malnutrition, tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS) could cause more severe cases.”
Responding to COVID-1932
Table 2: Definitions of populations vulnerable to COVID-19  
as at 31 March 2020
Category Inclusion criteria
Age 60 years and above
Non-communicable 
diseases
Hypertension; diabetes; cardiovascular disease; chronic 
respiratory diseases (e.g. chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease and asthma); chronic kidney disease; cancer 
(leukaemia, lymphoma or myeloma; or currently or recently 
undergoing chemotherapy treatment for any cancer type)
HIV/AIDS Known HIV-positive status
Tuberculosis Recent diagnosis of tuberculosis disease and/or currently 
undergoing treatment for tuberculosis
Pregnancy • Pregnant women identified as acutely malnourished
• Pregnant women with any of the other conditions 
listed in this table
Other immune-
deficiency conditions
• Severe immunodeficiency diseases
• Sickle cell disease (excluding sickle cell trait)
• On immunosuppressive treatment for any other reason
Other chronic 
conditions
• Hepatitis B infection 
• Hepatitis C infection
Source: Adapted from Favas et al. (2020).
ACTION 10
Employ containment approaches to reduce transmission 
In the absence of any vaccine or proven effective treatment for 
COVID-19, a key strategy for reducing transmission, mortality and pressure 
on the health system is to reduce mixing COVID-19 suspected and 
confirmed cases with non-infected individuals.
Many high-income countries have implemented a combination of self-
isolation, quarantine, social distancing (also known as physical distancing) 
and community containment (e.g. mass ‘stay-at-home’ strategies) with 
varying degrees of success in reducing the spread of the virus (Flaxman 
et al., 2020). However, these measures are unlikely to be feasible in many 
humanitarian settings (Dahab et al., 2020) and are also unlikely to reach 
sufficiently high levels of compliance to reduce community transmission, 
especially in places where it will threaten people’s livelihoods.
Given these limitations, humanitarian actors have already started 
experimenting with a range of context-specific approaches. These are 
summarised as follows under the headings: social distancing approaches; 
shielding approaches; and evacuation approaches.
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Social distancing
In many settings, social distancing – that is keeping two metres (6 feet) 
of distance between people – is not possible, given that space is a luxury few 
can afford (Lau et al., 2020). The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
guidance for COVID-19 readiness and response operations in humanitarian 
situations suggests the following actions for implementing social distancing 
in refugee camps or informal settlements (IASC, 2020a):
• conduct risk assessment to determine the characteristics of the site 
which may act as amplifiers of transmission
• map areas which are most at risk (e.g. areas where people live in 
overcrowded conditions or that have a higher proportion of vulnerable 
populations)
• wherever possible, implement mitigation measures to reduce 
overcrowding, for example painting crosses demarcating social 
distancing in queues for water pumps, village wells, shops, and  
market stalls
• provide additional social and economic assistance on site (e.g. food, 
cash and other distributions; services for registration or enrolment in 
assistance programmes; and education services), and switch to remote 
assistance where possible (e.g. mobile cash) to prevent large gatherings 
and movements of people.
These actions will be contingent on having enough human and financial 
resources, and strong multisectoral coordination and governance.
Shielding approaches
In settings where social distancing or self-isolation is not feasible, creative 
solutions will need to be implemented to protect vulnerable populations 
(see Table 2, Action 9). Dahab et al. (2020) have recommended taking a 
‘shielding’ approach’, defined as a more targeted approach of specifically 
preventing infections among groups at high risk of COVID-19 mortality. 
Favas et al. (2020) recommend the following actions to implement the 
shielding approach set out by Dahab et al (2020):
• Create ‘green zones’ – that is, dedicated areas at the household, 
neighbourhood or camp level to which vulnerable individuals (Action 
9) are temporarily relocated and have minimal contact with family 
members and other camp residents at lower risk of severe disease 
(Figure 2). Shielding should never be imposed; rather actors should 
assess its feasibility by consulting communities in each context.
• Coordinate with relevant sectors to ensure appropriate living 
conditions and access to basic services and social care for shielded 
residents (see Action 13).
• Create social care committees, composed of representatives from the 
families of vulnerable individuals being shielded, to facilitate acceptance 
of and adherence to the shielding measures.
• Ensure that shielded vulnerable persons do not leave the defined 
‘green zone’. Those shielded at home can be cared for by designated 
family members, friends, care workers or local groups of volunteers. 
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Those shielding at neighbourhood or sector level (Figure 2) should care 
for each other to minimise contact with people from outside the ‘green 
zone’.
It should be noted that evidence on this approach’s effectiveness to date 
is limited to a study conducted by researchers who modelled the impact of 
this intervention, along with other containment strategies, on the COVID-19 
burden in African countries. They found that:
Shielding of high-risk individuals can reduce health service demand 
and, even more markedly, mortality if it features high uptake and 
low contact of shielded and unshielded people, with no increase in 
contact among shielded people. (van Zandvoort et al., 2020).
The researchers recommended that strategies combining self-isolation, 
moderate physical distancing and shielding will likely achieve substantial 
reductions in mortality in African countries. However, this approach is 
contingent on populations being supported socially and economically.
Figure 2: Housing arrangements for each shielding option
 • Green zone: a specific area (a room, 
or a shelter in case of multi-shelter 
compound) within the household.
 • High-risk individuals are physically 
isolated from the other household 
members.
 • Other household members should 
not enter the green zone.
 • Movement outside the green zone 
should be minimised (shower/
latrines; if needed, a short walk 
during quiet hours when children 
are sleeping), and social distancing 
measures should be applied during 
such movements.
 • Green zone: a specific shelter/
group of shelters (with max. 5–10 
households), within a small camp area.
 • Neighbouring households voluntarily 
‘house swap’ and group their high-
risk members in the green zone.
 • High-risk individuals are physically 
isolated in the green zone.
 • Individuals not at high-risk should not 
enter the green zone.
 • Movements outside the green zone 
should be minimised (shower/
latrines), and social distancing 
measures should be applied during 
such movements.
 • Green zone: a specific group of 
shelters within a camp sector (max. 
50 high-risk individuals per single 
green zone).
 • High-risk individuals are physically 
isolated in the green zone.
 • A single physical entry point is 
established: exchange of people, 
food and other provisions are 
exclusively done through this point.
 • A meeting area close to the entry 
point is established, where green 
zone residents and visitors can 
interact. 
 • No movement outside the green zone.





Shelter Green zone shelter
Small camp area (a group of 




Green zone shelterHousehold Green zone
Household (can be a single shelter 
or multi-shelter compound)
Source: Favas et al. (2020).
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Evacuation approaches
In some settings, partial or complete evacuations of refugee camps, 
detention centres, high-risk informal settlements and provision of more 
adequate shelter and housing may be the only solution, even if not 
politically expedient. Humanitarian actors should work with relevant 
actors to advocate for major changes to the organisation and location of 
the most vulnerable groups (e.g. evacuating camps and releasing prisoners 
or rehousing slum residents) while ensuring that their basic needs and 
dignities continue to be met.
Key resources
• Africa CDC. (2020c) Guidance on community social distancing 
during COVID-19 outbreak. 17 March 2020. Africa CDC. 
(https://africacdc.org/download/guidance-on-community-social-
distancing-during-covid-19-outbreak).
• Dahab, M. et al. (2020) ‘COVID-19 control in low-income 
settings and displaced populations: what can realistically be 
done?’. LSHTM, 20 March 2020. (www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/
news/2020/covid-19-control-low-income-settings-and-displaced-
populations-what-can).
• Favas, C. et al. (2020) Guidance for the prevention of COVID-19 
infection among high-risk individuals in camps and camp-like 





• IASC. (2020a) Interim guidance: scaling-up COVID-19 outbreak 
readiness and response operations in humanitarian situations 






Support socially and economically sensitive approaches to  
quarantine and isolation 
When shielding, quarantine, or self-isolation measures are put in place 
for affected populations, humanitarian actors should work to mitigate other 
adverse effects. Such containment interventions are likely to have adverse 
socioeconomic impacts on individuals and their households.
Containment strategies undertaken or supported by humanitarian 
organisations and their partners needs to be clearly grounded in social 
and cultural contexts and be sensitive to existing economic inequities and 
vulnerabilities. Additionally, it will also be important for humanitarian 
actors to consider the needs of people with disabilities, young children, 
pregnant and lactating mothers, and those with special dietary needs.
Key resources
• WHO. (2020i) Considerations for quarantine of individuals in 




• WHO. (2020j) Home care for patients with COVID-19 presenting 





Implement WASH interventions for effective infection 
prevention and control
Better WASH practices can be achieved through behaviour-change 
interventions, with the main areas of focus for humanitarian actors being 
communities and healthcare facilities. In addition to COVID-19-specific 
WASH programming, efforts need to ensure continuity of existing WASH 
services and infrastructure (see Box 3).
“To improve the community’s acceptance of such 
measures, humanitarian organisations should dedicate 
resources to WASH communications campaigns.”
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Box 4: Critical COVID-19 WASH activities for humanitarian 
contexts
Think ‘outside the box’ of traditional top-down solutions to mobilise 
bottom-up and other creative solutions (e.g. subsidising water and 
soap through private providers).
• Undertake COVID-19 WASH coordination and planning with 
WASH partners to maximise WASH service continuity and 
ensure a clear division of labour to reduce duplication of effort.
• Pre-position essential WASH supplies.
• Provide health workers and all relevant staff including WASH 
staff (e.g. pump operators, technicians, waste management 
staff) with handwashing supplies and PPE.
• Identify backup WASH staff to ensure critical job redundancy.
• Distribute WASH non-food items via non-contact methods.
• When resources for WASH interventions are limited, prioritise 
supplies to ‘green zones’ shielding vulnerable groups (Action 10).
• Adapt communal WASH facilities with social distancing 
measures, for example by increasing pumping operation times to 
reduce queuing or marking social distance intervals at communal 
water points and toilets.
• Ensure WASH facilities are available in areas dedicated to 
quarantine or isolation.
Source: UNHCR (2020).
WASH-related IPC in communities 
Experience from the Ebola Outbreak shows that certain forms of hand 
hygiene (e.g. frequent handwashing; avoiding shaking hands with others; 
and avoiding touching eyes, nose and mouth with unwashed hands) can be 
readily and easily accepted by different communities. 
There are many settings in which access to water and soap is limited, 
so their frequent use is challenging. In this regard, the evidence suggests 
three measures: (1) expanding water tank provision; (2) providing more 
handwashing stations; and (3) distribution of alcohol-based hand rubs, 
which can be produced locally. As a last resort, chlorine solutions could be 
used, although measures should be taken to ensure that these are prepared 
in safe ways to reduce potential toxic risks.
To improve the community’s acceptance of such measures, humanitarian 
organisations should dedicate resources to WASH communications 
campaigns (see Action 4). In the COVID-19 response in Cox’s Bazar, 
Bangladesh, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has 
started installing portable handwashing facilities at every community centre 
and has developed a managed roll-out of information in the three languages 
spoken in the camp in line with WHO public guidance.
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WASH-related IPC in healthcare facilities
The WHO has defined an approach called ‘My 5 Moments for Hand 
Hygiene’, which outlines when healthcare workers should clean their hands 
(WHO, n.d.). The five moments are:
• before touching a patient
• before clean/aseptic procedures
• after body fluid exposure/risk (including after touching PPE,  
e.g. adjusting a mask)
• after touching a patient
• after touching patient surroundings.
Building on these, there are a number of key recommendations for 
WASH in healthcare facilities as a whole:
• Ensure that staff and patients have separate toilets, and, where possible, 
COVID-19 patients should have separate toilets.
• Ensure that all patients and healthcare workers have knowledge of and 
apply strictly respiratory hygiene.
• Ensure supplies of safe water, soap or alcohol-based hand rub 
in adequate quantity and sanitation services at all times, ensure 
handwashing station or alcohol-based hand rub is positioned in each 
care room.
• Ensure adequate and regular supplies of PPE for staff (medical masks, 
goggles or face shield, long-sleeve gown, gloves), and ensure staff are 
trained to properly use PPE.
• Ensure adequate supplies of detergent (such as sodium hypochlorite) 
and ensure that environmental cleaning and disinfection procedures are 
followed consistently and correctly.
Teaching hygiene practices to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Somalia. Photo credit: Trócaire.
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E. Enhancing case management
ACTION 13
Adapt health facilities and protocols 
Whereas Action 4 and Action 5 describe actions for humanitarian 
actors to take in preparing key staff and health facilities for the COVID-19 
response, this Action focuses on how to organise the delivery of care for 
suspected or confirmed COVID-19 cases. Detailed clinical guidance is not 
summarised in this Action but can be found in the key resources listed at the 
end of the section.
This section sets out actions for two distinct scenarios that humanitarian 
actors may face, to enable them to organise the delivery of timely 
and quality care for suspected and confirmed COVID-19 patients in 
humanitarian settings. 
• Facility scenario A: Individual patients coming to the facility
• Facility scenario B: Simultaneous influx of many patients to the facility 
Note that these actions are based on WHO guidance for low- and middle-
income countries (WHO, 2020k; Nigeria PHCDA, 2020), and will need to 
be further tailored to each setting depending on the agreed strategies for 
containment (Action 11 and Action 12) and testing (Action 8).
Facility scenario A: Individual patients coming to the facility
• Implement the established triage system (Action 4), for example by 
positioning at least one designated health facility staff member (a point 
person) at the facility entrance to ensure that patients are screened for 
symptoms before entering the facility and to enforce social distancing 
measures. This person should be stationed outdoors if weather and 
facility layout permits. 
• In many humanitarian settings, this point person could be a community 
volunteer.
• Ensure that health workers and volunteers put on the appropriate 
PPE before attending to any patient.
• Maintain at least one arm’s-length distance from patients and ensure 
that other patients waiting to be assessed maintain ideally at least 
2 metres (6 feet) between each other, or at minimum, an arm’s-length 
distance.
• Use an infrared thermometer (where available) to quickly measure the 
temperature of every patient before allowing them entry to the facility.
• Ask all patients about whether they have or are experiencing respiratory 
symptoms including cough, shortness of breath and a sore throat, and 
systemic symptoms such as body aches or chills.
• Triage to identify patients with fever, cough or shortness of breath, and 
follow instructions set out at the end of this section, under ‘Dealing with 
patients with fever and/or respiratory symptoms’.
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Facility scenario B: Simultaneous influx of many patients to the facility 
(e.g. for antenatal care)
• Implement the established triage system (Action 4), for example by 
positioning at least one health facility staff member (a point person) at 
the facility entrance to gather all patients in one waiting area, ensuring 
a social distance of 2 metres (6 feet) between patients or, if this is not 
possible, at least one arm’s-length distance. This person should be 
stationed outdoors if weather and facility layout permits.
• In many humanitarian settings, this point person could be a 
community volunteer or community health worker linked to the 
health facility.
• Ensure that health workers and volunteers put on the appropriate 
PPE before attending to any patient.
• Quickly measure all patients’ temperature using (where available) an 
infrared thermometer.
• At least one designated health facility staff member (e.g. community 
volunteer or community health worker) should ask all patients about 
whether they have or are experiencing respiratory symptoms including 
cough, shortness of breath and a sore throat, and systemic symptoms 
such as body aches or chills.
• Separate patients with fever and respiratory symptoms from other 
patients without symptoms.
• Keep patients with symptoms in a separate waiting room from those 
without symptoms. Ensure that all patients maintain ideally at least 
2 metres (6 feet) away from each other or, if this is not possible, at a 
minimum, an arm’s-length distance.
• Follow instructions set out at the end of this section, under ‘Dealing with 
patients with fever and/or respiratory symptoms’.
Dealing with patients with fever and/or respiratory symptoms
For both scenarios A and B, the subsequent guidance should be followed 
when dealing with patients with fever and/or respiratory symptoms:
• Ask about travel history, close contact with a confirmed case or exposure 
to a health facility in which COVID-19 has been reported (refer to case 
definition in agreed protocols).
• Ascertain if patient meets the case definition for suspected case of 
COVID-19 and follow specified procedures for notifying relevant 
authorities and stakeholders as outlined in agreed protocols.
• Counsel patient and explain to them why they are a suspected case and 
why the containment strategy in this setting (e.g. isolation/quarantine/
social distancing) is critical; and provide them guidance on how to 
access critical social and economic assistance if following an isolation or 
quarantine strategy. If tolerated, ask them to wear a mask (if masks  
are available).
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• In line with agreed protocols, keep suspected cases that qualify for 
testing (if testing is being done on site) and/or cases that qualify for 
further treatment in isolation in a room or corner space (if available) 
within the facility or designated isolated area (e.g. outdoor space, 
school or other empty building). If the patient needs to be sent off site 
for testing and/or treatment, they should remain in isolation until an 
ambulance or other transportation arrives. Do nothing to the patient 
and do not allow anyone in the isolation room or area to come in close 
contact.
• Refer to and support the transportation of suspected COVID-19 cases to 
the nearest testing or treatment centre.
• Immediately after a suspected case leaves the isolation area, clean with 
disinfectant (e.g. by adding 50 millilitres of bleaching agent to 4 litres of 
water) surfaces that are within 6 feet of where the patient was kept.
• Items that cannot be disinfected, such as magazines and other paper 
materials, should be disposed of. This is in addition to the regular 
(frequent) baseline cleaning and disinfection process that should be 
occurring for the entire waiting area (see Action 12).
• If a patient tests positive for COVID-19, follow the agreed protocol for 
contact tracing, if this is a feasible action that can be prioritised in the 
setting (see Action 7).
Key resources
• WHO. (2020l) Operational considerations for case management 
of COVID-19 in health facility and community: interim guidance 
[19 March 2020]. Geneva: WHO: 7–8. (https://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331492/WHO-2019-nCoV-HCF_
operations-2020.1-eng.pdf).
• Nigeria PHCDA. (2020) Preparedness and response to 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) at primary healthcare 
and community level. Lagos: National Primary Health Care 





Deliver appropriate and relevant critical care measures 
Data from high-income countries suggest 5% of symptomatic cases 
will require ventilation or become critical, 15% of patients with ‘severe’ 
diagnoses will need oxygen and 80% of cases will be ‘mild’, requiring basic 
care at most (Wu and McGoogan, 2020). 
Some experts have called for essential emergency and critical care for 
those patients who do become critically unwell (Lee et al., 2019; Baker et 
al., 2020; Ismail et al., 2020). Basic interventions for humanitarian actors to 
implement would include: (1) delivering oxygen to patients lying on their 
front (‘proning’); (2) suction; (3) chest physiotherapy; and (5) appropriate 
use of antibiotics for bacterial infections to help improve outcomes. 
However, it should be noted that an intensive care unit or critical-
care-focused model for many humanitarian settings will be extremely 
challenging to comprehensively implement at the scale that will be needed, 
given the limited capacities in humanitarian settings in terms of intensive 
care unit beds, specialist equipment and trained staff.
Key resources
• WHO. (2020g) Clinical care for severe acute respiratory 
infection: toolkit – COVID-19 adaptation. Geneva: WHO.  
(https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/331736).
• Lee, J.S., Roberts, S.W., Götsch, K., Moeller, U. and Hawryluck, 
L. (2019) ‘Caring for critically ill patients in humanitarian settings’. 
American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 199(5): 
572–580. (https://doi.org/10.1164/rccm.201806-1059CP).
• Ayebare, R.R., Flick, R., Okware, S., Bodo, B. and Lamorde, M. 
(2020) ‘Adoption of COVID-19 triage strategies for low-income 
settings’. The Lancet Respiratory Medicine 8(4).  
(https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-2600(20)30114-4).





1. Mobilise locally appropriate, joined-up community-led initiatives
2. Support local actors to lead the response
3. Work in politically and socially sensitive ways 
4. Duty of care for response workers at all levels is essential
5. Establish and share ethical guidelines for the response
6. Anticipate and work collectively to offset adverse secondary 
impacts 





In addition to humanitarian principles, which need to continue to be 
the core guiding principles of the COVID-19 response, our analysis and 
stakeholder consultation suggests seven additional cross-cutting principles 
that should shape how each of the actions are implemented. These are:
1. Mobilise locally appropriate, joined-up community-led initiatives
2. Support local actors to lead the response 
3. Work in politically and socially sensitive ways
4. Duty of care for response workers at all levels is essential 
5. Establish and share ethical guidelines for the response
6. Anticipate and work collectively to offset adverse secondary impacts
7. Invest in operational learning, research and innovation efforts
PRINCIPLE 1:  MOBILISE LOCALLY APPROPRIATE, JOINED-
UP COMMUNITY-LED INITIATIVES
The international humanitarian sector has tended to learn the hard 
way the lesson about the importance of community engagement – if it 
has learned it at all. The lessons from the Ebola Outbreak are clear: if 
international organisations had engaged with communities effectively and 
from the outset, listening to concerns and considering social and cultural 
contexts, the response would have been more effective. Evidence shows 
that communities can understand what is required in epidemic responses 
and can rapidly learn to change high-risk practices to help to reduce 
transmission (Laverack and Manoncourt, 2016).
The pressures on international and national capacities mean that a 
community-led action, facilitated and enabled by local actors, will be 
the mainstay of the COVID-19 humanitarian response –from planning 
to detection to prevention, and eventually case management (Wellcome, 
IDS and Anthrologica, 2020). From the outset, humanitarian actors 
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need to combine top-down planning and anticipation with more 
bottom-up, community-led approaches.
Humanitarians also need to develop and use a systematic, testable and 
adaptable approach to support and mobilise communities from the very 
beginning. While there are clear and accepted protocols for community 
involvement in areas such as community management of acute malnutrition 
and community-led sanitation, there are no such agreed protocols for 
infectious disease management (Ntumba et al., 2019). The work of the 
Social Mobilisation Action Consortium, funded by the UK Department for 
International Development, and the guidance on Community Led Ebola 
Action is a good starting point (see key resources). 
Key resources
• Restless Development. (2014) Community-Led Ebola Action 
(CLEA): field guide for community mobilisers. London: Restless 
Development for the Social Mobilisation Action Consortium. 
(https://restlessdevelopment.org/file/smac-clea-field-manual-pdf).
• Wellcome, IDS and Anthrologica. (2020) Key considerations: 
online information, mis- and disinformation in the context of 




PRINCIPLE 2: SUPPORT LOCAL ACTORS TO LEAD THE 
RESPONSE
Out of necessity, many COVID-19 strategies and the resulting 
interventions will have to be staffed, owned and led by actors in and from 
the national and local level (at least in the short to medium term). This will 
demand upfront determination of the different roles and functions that will 
be played respectively by national and local authorities, national and local 
civil society organisations, international non-governmental organisations, 
UN agencies and international donors. In those contexts where there is no 
de facto state actor, this will need to be acknowledged and workarounds 
developed (ICVA, 2020).
For detection, prevention and case management to be successful, 
humanitarians will need to prioritise the harmonising and integrating 
of efforts between these groups of stakeholders. This means supporting 
flexible and anticipatory responses at different levels, simplifying lines of 
reporting and accountability, and minimising unnecessary bureaucracy 
(IASC, 2020b). Evidence suggests that for maximal programmatic flexibility, 
decentralised and highly localised decision-making is key, therefore local and 
national actors also need to be given the space to take appropriate decisions 
as situations on the ground change (Campbell and Knox Clarke, 2018).
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This poses a challenge to the traditional modus operandi of 
humanitarian response, whereby relationships between international 
and national partners function more reactively and in an ad hoc fashion 
(rather than being planned and strategic). For the COVID-19 response to 
be successful, this needs to change, and quickly. Significant resources must 
be allocated and channeled to those local organisations that are in the front 
line of epidemic prevention and response work.
There is a particular need to ensure that local organisations do not 
become instrumentalised in the COVID-19 responses. Humanitarians 
might address this in a number of ways, all of which involve moving from 
a subcontractor mode of transferring risk to a partnership mode of 
sharing risks (Ramalingam et al., 2013). This includes: paying for not only 
programme activities but also salaries and other institutional functions 
through reasonable overheads; investing meaningfully in staff capacities, 
especially for those organisations new to public health work; supporting 
essential functions such as human resources, financial management, staff 
medical and psychosocial care; and providing a platform for local actors to 
have their voices heard at an international level. 
Key resources
• A4EP – Alliance for Empowering Partnership. (2020) Localised 
response to COVID-19 global pandemic: A4EA position paper. 
Dhaka: A4EP. (http://a4ep.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/
A4EP-COVID_19-position-paper_Final.pdf).
• ICVA – International Council of Voluntary Agencies. (2020) 
Reinforce, reinforce, reinforce: localization in the COVID-19 
global humanitarian response. Geneva: ICVA. (www.icvanetwork.
org/system/files/versions/ICVA_Localization_COVID19.pdf).
• Ramalingam, B., Gray, B. and Cerruti, G. (2013) Missed 
opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local 
partnership-based humanitarian responses. London: ActionAid, 
CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB and Tearfund (www.
christianaid.org.uk/resources/about-us/missed-opportunities-
case-strengthening-national-and-local-partnership-based).
PRINCIPLE 3: WORK IN POLITICALLY AND SOCIALLY 
SENSITIVE WAYS 
Terms such as ‘community’ and ‘local actor’ are powerful but also 
problematic. In the extreme, their unthinking use can lead to strategic and 
operational oversimplifications and allow humanitarian efforts to ignore 
political and social realities, differences and inequities.
Humanitarian actors in particular should consider undertaking the 
following to strengthen the response’s political and social sensitivity: 
Operational principles for effective responses 47
• Strengthen the political economy lens taken in the response by 
reviewing regularly the overall direction of travel, using context analysis 
and political economy approaches as a basis for sharing experiences 
and ideas about political and social realities and reflecting on what they 
mean for the response as a whole and at different levels.
• Regularly and strategically synthesise learnings from the interventions 
to get a sense of how things are shaping and being shaped by political 
realities, focusing in particular on how humanitarian, development and 
peacebuilding efforts do or do not align.
• Consider focusing on several system-wide political and social themes 
and issues, which can be used to prioritise collective programme-wide 
learning and advocacy efforts (suggestions include: political affiliations; 
prevailing conflicts around resource distribution and allocation; ethnic 
and religious issues; or history of violent conflict and fragility).
• Review existing monitoring, evaluation and learning tools to ensure 
they are generating the right kinds of information to support strategic 
and tactical decision-making for a politically grounded and sensitive 
response (Booth et al., 2016). 
PRINCIPLE 4: DUTY OF CARE FOR RESPONSE WORKERS 
AT ALL LEVELS IS ESSENTIAL 
Across the COVID-19 response, effort needs to be made to ensure duty 
of care for responders is a strategic imperative. Specific suggestions for 
humanitarians include: 
• establishing clear duty-of-care policies and protocols for the 
interventions and scenarios for how different needs will be met 
• encouraging from the outset appropriate budgeting and resourcing for 
care mainstreaming in projects and programmes
• facilitating reporting of issues and how they are addressed to support 
better learning. 
• actively promoting duty-of-care competences among responding 
organisations, and facilitating online and social platforms for mutual 
support 
• prioritising within duty-of-care considerations for those at the frontline 
of the response moral injury (and distress as a result of this), the risk of 
which is considerable (Parker and Mirzaali, 2020)
• establishing appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure 
responding organisations are providing mechanisms to monitor these 
activities, raise complaints and communicate issues.
Humanitarian actors should consider carefully the financial implications 




• ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross. (2014) ‘Rights 
and responsibilities of health-care personnel’. Geneva: ICRC. 
(http://elearning.icrc.org/healthcareindanger-2015/en).
PRINCIPLE 5: ESTABLISH AND SHARE ETHICAL 
GUIDELINES FOR THE RESPONSE
As well as the broader societal ethics that are playing out around 
COVID-19 – for example in forgoing rights and privileges such as free 
movement, wider family relations and communal gathering – ethical issues 
are also arising in the context of the response itself. The humanitarian 
sector can develop and agree on normative guidance on the ethics related 
to technical responses, to make sure that difficult decisions are made in the 
best possible way.
At a national level, this means using existing ethical frameworks to 
deliver healthcare and research and anticipating the specific ethical 
challenges that might be faced in different response scenarios (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2020). Concurrently, humanitarian actors should 
develop contextually appropriate ethical guideline packs, based on the 
response scenarios identified, and create communications learning 
materials and processes to ensure ethical mechanisms are accessible and 
understood by all relevant actors and stakeholders.
Beyond the case management and clinical dimensions of response ethics, 
humanitarians must also ensure that detection, prevention and planning 
are undertaken in ethically sensitive ways. Of particular concern is the risk 
of privacy and rights being contravened by detection and containment 
systems, especially those that involve digital technologies and the use of 
patient and citizen data. In such cases, a ‘do no digital harm’ approach must 
be paramount (MacDonald, 2020).
Key resources
• Nuffield Council on Bioethics. (2020b) ‘COVID-19 ethics 
resources’. [Webpage]. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, last 
updated 15 April. (www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publications/
covid-19/covid-19-ethics-resources).
• MacDonald, S. (2020) ‘The digital response to the outbreak of 
COVID-19’. [Opinion]. Waterloo ON: Centre for International 
Governance Innovation. (www.cigionline.org/articles/digital-
response-outbreak-covid-19).
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PRINCIPLE 6: ANTICIPATE AND WORK COLLECTIVELY TO 
OFFSET ADVERSE SECONDARY IMPACTS 
The COVID-19 Pandemic is a health, social and economic emergency 
simultaneously. 
The evidence on the secondary impacts is clear and covers:
• disruption of livelihoods and markets
• disruption to communities
• disruption to basic services, health, education, social safety nets
• stigmatisation
• psychosocial problems
• increased sexual and gender-based violence
• human rights violations 
• weakening trust in governance. 
(Rohwerder, 2020)
As a result, the response cannot be thought about simply in public health 
terms. For the humanitarian sector, this means developing and using a 
systemic lens to consider both primary and secondary effects of the planned 
response. This would entail reviewing the agreed portfolio of interventions 
based on available evidence, asking the following questions of different 
interventions:
• What is the intervention logic for this activity?
• What evidence do we currently have on the primary and secondary 
effects of this activity?
• What processes and capacities do we need to deal with these effects? 
• How can we draw on all of the capabilities of the humanitarian system 
and on those of other national and local stakeholders – from government 
to private sector organisations, civil society to the media?
At a minimum, the other sectors in humanitarian response – WASH, food 
security and livelihoods – need to be mobilised in direct support of both the 
COVID-19 response strategy and to offset the secondary effects (see Table 3).
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Table 3: Direct and offsetting interventions for health and other 
sectors in the humanitarian response to consider in support of the 
COVID-19 response 
Direct support Offsetting support 
• How to mainstream COVID-19 
prevention into WASH work?
• How to ensure food and cash 
distributions do not lead to mass 
gatherings? (IASC, 2020c)
• How to transform a cash transfer 
programme when no market is 
available?
• How to ensure continuity of essential 
health services, e.g. antenatal care and 
deliveries?
• How to maintain essential care for 
other infectious diseases and chronic 
conditions?
• How to maintain supply chains for food 
and essential medicines?
• How to scale up shock-responsive 
social safety nets?
Source: Kelly (2020).
PRINCIPLE 7: INVEST IN OPERATIONAL LEARNING, 
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION EFFORTS
The COVID-19 response is in many ways unprecedented and there is 
much that will be undertaken for the first time. Moreover, there are also 
several areas where what should be done is not yet fully understood, or it is 
understood the resources to make it happen are not yet in place. 
In this context, humanitarian organisations must maintain their 
commitments to learning and accountability. Humanitarians should 
employ light-touch monitoring, learning and evaluation approaches to 
support adaptive decision-making during the crisis and to provide critical 
information for learning about the COVID-19 response to inform effective 
approaches that could be useful in future responses. This should be guided 
by the outstanding questions that humanitarians face (see Box 4).
Box 5: Outstanding questions to shape ongoing learning
• How does COVID-19 behave in low-resource and humanitarian 
settings?
• Which populations at higher risks of severe illness from 
COVID-19 in humanitarian settings?
• What are the most effective strategies or combination of 
strategies to reduce transmission in these settings?
• What can be feasibly done when there are limited supplies (e.g. 
PPE, ventilators, oxygen) and capacity and recommended public 
health measures and treatments cannot be implemented?
• What is the best way to prioritise and maintain essential routine 
health services? 
• How should trade-offs be made between investment in 
COVID-19 responses and dealing with other drivers of mortality?
• How should trade-offs be made between containment measures 
and the secondary impacts of COVID-19 (e.g. socioeconomic) 
on populations?
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There are a number of ways in which humanitarian actors can improve 
operational learning, research and innovation: 
• Invest in ongoing operational monitoring, learning, evaluation, 
knowledge sharing and good practice development for improving the 
response – e.g. how to undertake effective surveillance and testing 
without biomedical supplies
• Share available aggregated and disaggregated data by age, gender, 
ethnicity, displacement status and disability status for analysis by 
research and academic partners.
• Ensure programmatic adaptations to deliver on response objectives in 
extremely constrained situations – e.g. how to undertake shielding in 
refugee camps.
• Facilitate and support innovations in delivery and stakeholder 
engagement – e.g. how to do effective and evidence-informed 
community mobilisation. 
• Invest in local and national capacities, from private sector to 
universities, to develop key products and services using locally available 
resources – e.g. PPE, handwashing liquids and gels, and community 
health worker training.
• Where possible, enable and support country-level research and learning 
strategies, broadening networks, prioritising engagement with relevant 
universities, business groups and trade associations at national and 
potentially regional level. 
“Invest in ongoing operational monitoring, learning, 
evaluation, knowledge sharing and good practice 
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